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COMPUTER TRANSACTIONS: POTENTIAL
LIABILITY OF COMPUTER USERS
AND VENDORS
JAMES P. CHANDLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The computer industry has developed in the past twenty-five years
into a multi-billion dollar business. The use of computers and data
processing services has touched nearly every aspect of American
society, resulting in increasing reliance upon the benefits provided by
such technology. Society's reliance upon the automated machine has,
in turn, created the novel and perplexing problem of computer legal
liability. Who is liable to whom when one's computer breaks down?
When a computer user furnishes erroneous data to others, what
is the nature and extent of his liability? When a business or other insti-,
tution relies upon its own erroneous computer data, what is its liability
exposure? This Article will review the social milieu in which computer
liability issues arise. It will explore the alternative legal theories upon
which liability of the computer manufacturer and user might be based,
from the negligent use of computer information to the implied or ex-
press warranties of computer vendors. Finally, it will suggest various
methods by which users and dealers might avoid or reduce their liabil-
ity exposure.'
II. SOCIAL MILIEU OF COMPUTERS
It is difficult to live in American society today and avoid contact with
the ubiquitous computerized information system. Anyone who has
sought insurance from a major life and health insurance company might
very well have had the details of his health and personal life investi-
gated by computer research. The Medical Information Bureau of
* J.D., University of California-Davis; LL.M., Harvard University; Professor of
Law, National Law Center, George Washington University.
1. The Article will not cover liability arising out of violations of the criminal laws,
patent, trademark, copyright, or trade secrecy laws, SEC Regulations, antitrust laws, or
privacy protection laws.
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Greenwich, Connecticut, for example, sells investigative reports on in-
surance applicants to its member companies at a rate of 20 million per
year. 2 Of even greater significance is the fact that births and deaths
are now frequently recorded in computer data banks. In addition, fed-
eral law enforcement agencies maintain extensive computer records on
large segments of the population. On occasion these records contain
erroneous data. The disclosure of such information can have severe
consequences. A recent incident illustrates the danger. On January
18, 1970, Paul Cowan was arrested for possession of marijuana in
Brooklyn, New York.3 He was never prosecuted and two months later
the charges were formally dismissed. He later moved to Boston, and
in September, 1970, he applied for a license to drive a cab. Although
his application was accepted and a license issued, a routine check with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation subsequently revealed an "open"
charge against Cowan in New York. On the basis of this computer re-
port, Cowan's license was revoked because he was deemed "not a suit-
able person to be so licensed." Cowan's case is interesting, and indeed
unusual, not because erroneous information had been recorded in some
data bank and routinely disclosed, but because Cowan actually dis-
covered the error.
The increased reliance on computers by commercial business has
also created many legal problems. Accounting functions are often per-
formed automatically by computers with little or no human oversight.
Consequently, errors in the computer's operational programs may go
undetected and are compounded with each accounting cycle. Such
errors can place significant burdens on unsuspecting consumers. In
one case,4 for example, customers of a gasoline utility company were
billed by computer. No actual readings of the customers' gas meters
were entered into the computer data bank; rather, the computer auto-
matically estimated the charges and sent the bills. Under this system,
one customer received a series of estimated bills for ten to fifteen dol-
lars. After an actual reading was taken, however, the customer re-
ceived a bill for almost two hundred dollars, 5 an amount far beyond
2. See A. WEsrTN & M. BAKER, DATA BANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY 88, 90 (1972).
3. Neier, Marked for Life, Have You Ever Been Arrested? N.Y. Times, Apr. 15,
1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 16, col. 1.
4. Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972),
af'd, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
5. 479 F.2d at 157 n.2, 158.
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her budget limits. In such a case may the customer resist demands
for immediate payment of the accumulated sum?
Another problem arises when the computer fails to record payment.
Payment notices usually contain the following statement: "If payment
has been made, please disregard this notice." This disclaimer is in-
cluded because computer-billing systems automatically bill customers
unless their payments are received early enough to be entered into the
creditor's computer. The problem arises where a customer ignores a
utility's shut-off notice because he has sent his payment. If the utility
company's computer either makes an error or fails to record the pay-
ment, the utility may be shut off without further notice to the unsuspect-
ing customer.6
A different type of problem arises for the businessman who attempts
to compete in the computer era by purchasing a system designed to
meet his particular needs. Because the ordinary businessman usually
knows little about purchasing computer services, he generally relies on
the vendor's representations. If the system fails to live up to those
representations, who is liable to whom and for what damages? The
purchaser in such a situation is often faced with the onerous task of
proving that the computer system, which he was incapable of designing
or developing, has technical shortcomings that are the cause of his in-
jury.7  Computer users today, however, cannot be expected to under-
stand and bargain on an equal basis with the suppliers of computer ser-
vices. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the courts to examine such
transactions and distribute the burdens fairly.
Another interesting and as yet unsettled problem posed by the rapid
development of the computer industry concerns the legal status of the
technological products of computer systems. For example, is a com-
puter program "property" in a legal sense, capable of being the subject
matter of a civil or criminal suit? If a computer program is a new type
of property, how can it be protected or, in the event of loss or theft,
valued?" The method by which the legal system will eventually accom-
modate computer property is an unresolved yet intriguing question.
6. The automatic shut-off of utility services may raise constitutional questions. See
notes 49-50 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 68-70 infra and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967) (trial court correctly
held that computer program index cards were property with an ascertainable value in
excess of $50 such that by taking them the defendant committed felony theft).
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These examples illustrate only a few of the numerous settings in
which computer liability issues may arise. The special problems of
computer legal liability have been further exacerbated by the phe-
nomenal developments in computer technology itself.
III. HISTORY
The precipitous expansion of computers into the commercial market
began in the middle 1950s. This expansion can be divided into three
eras, each identified by the technical capabilities of its respective
machines.9 The earliest computers were characteristically made with
thousands of vacuum tubes, were comparatively slow and bulky, and
required a tremendous amount of energy to power them. Consequently,
the commercial marketing of these computers was restricted to govern-
mental agencies such as the defense department and the larger indus-
trial corporations.' 0
The adaptation of the transistor to computers in the late 1950s facili-
tated the development of smaller and faster units, and ushered in the
second generation of computers." The transistor breakthrough was
followed in 1964 by the development of the integrated circuit. Inte-
grated circuitry consists of the "fabrication of a complete electronic cir-
cuit on a single encapsulated chip . . . rather than the older printed
circuit boards that had their components attached as discrete parts."'-
These circuits allowed further reductions in size, breakdowns, and
operating costs, and enabled the development of faster and more capable
machines. This technological advance, together with the shift to byte
logic, introduced the third generation of computers.' 3
9. See generally D. SANDERS, COMPUTERS IN SOCIETY (1973); Rosen, Electronic
Computers: A Historical Survey, 1969 COMPUTING SURVEYS 7.
10. D. SANDERS, supra note 9, at 8.
11. Saul Rosen said of the transistor, "By 1956 it was already apparent that tran-
sistors could be used in very large numbers and at very high speeds to produce computers
whose performance would dwarf that of the largest vacuum tube computers ever built."
Rosen, supra note 9, at 25.
12. F. GRUENBERGER, COMPUTERS AND THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 14-15 (1975).
13. The actual technical line separating the second generation from the third is un-
clear. It is held by some to be the development of the integrated circuit, by others to
be the shift to byte logic, a development which allowed the efficient use of the same
machine by business and science, and by still others to be the overall improvement in
the capabilities of computing machines. Compare SANDERS, supra note 9, at 58, and
Rosen, supra note 9, at 29, with F. GRUENBERGER, supra note 12, at 15.
[Vol. 1977:405
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A comparison of the capabilities of computers from each generation
is essential to an understanding of the liability issues and theories aris-
ing from computer use.
A. Size
The size of computer hardware has been drastically reduced by the
invention of the integrated circuit. The ENIAC, a popular first genera-
tion computer, contained 18,000 vacuum tubes, weighed 30 tons, and
required 1500 square feet of floor space.' 4 If built today, first genera-
tion computers such as the ENIAC would need fewer than 700 integrated
circuits.1" As noted, the integrated circuit compresses on minute en-
capsulated chips all the components formerly attached to printed circuit
boards.' 6 The Iliac IV computer, introduced in 1973, squeezes 1200
transistors, 1200 resistors, and 71 diodes on a one-tenth square inch
chip. 17 At least one scientist predicts that within a decade the technol-
ogy will exist to place enough components in a cubic inch of material
to equal one-fourth the density of a nerve cell in the human brain.'
In addition, while a computer in 1956 required 10,000 cubic feet
of floor space for efficient operation, the same amount of computing
power today can be placed in ten cubic feet. And the technology
exists to place that ten cubic feet of computer into space the size of a
typewriter.19
B. Speed
The operational speed of computers has increased so greatly over the
past twenty-five years that the unit of measurement has changed.
While first generation computer speed was measured in milliseconds,
or thousandths of a second, second generation computers measured
time in microseconds, or millionths of a second, and third and fourth
generation computers measure time in nanoseconds, or billionths of
a second. At present, some computers measure speed in trillionths of
a second and ultimately they may operate at the speed of electricity
-about one foot per nanosecond.20  A second measure of computing
14. See D. SANDERS, supra note 9, at 38.
15. See D. SANDERS, supra note 9, at 58.
16. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
17. See D. SANDERS, supra note 9, at 58.
18. See D. SANDERS, supra note 9, at 58-59.
19. See F. GRUENBERGER, supra note 12, at 10.
20. See D. SANDERS, supra note 9, at 59-60 & n.6.
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power is the speed at which computers can perform transactions. The
ENIAC could perform 300 multiplications per second. Present com-
putor transaction speeds vary with machine size. Today's large com-
puters can execute 100,000,000 instructions per second; medium to
large computers can execute one million instructions per second; and
minicomputers can perform as many as 250,000 instructions per sec-
ond.21
C. Memory
Storage space for information, like computer speed, has increased
dramatically since the introduction of the first commercial computers.
Early computers had a primary storage capacity of 2000 to 4000
"words." By contrast, present computers can store over a million words
and, with the development of vertual storage (external online stor-
age), a single computer may be able to store from 500 billion to a
trillion alphanumerical characters.2"
D. Reliability
The technological advances over the past twenty-five years have
greatly improved the reliability of computer systems. The mean time
between failures, for example, has increased from hundreds of hours
to thousands of hours. And with the introduction of self-repairing com-
puters in which a new reserve part would automatically replace a
broken part,2" the mean time between failures could be extended further,
or even eliminated, if several replacements for each part were always
available and the broken parts periodically repaired.
E. Cost
The rapid development of computer technology has also resulted in
the continuous reduction of computing costs: they have been cut in half
every two years. In the late 1940s, one could purchase 600,000 exe-
cuted instructions for three dollars, whereas today one can purchase ten
million instructions for a dollar. If the present trend continues, the
price of executed instructions will drop to 50 to 100 billion instructions
per dollar by 1984 and two billion per penny by the year 2000.24
21. See F. GRUENBERGER, supra note 12, at 7.
22. See D. SArdes, supra note 9, at 60-61.
23. See D. SANDERS, supra note 9, at 60-61.
24. See F. GRUENBERGER, supra note 12, at 9,
[Vol. 1977:405
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F. Social Consequences
Improvements such as the integrated circuit, virtual storage,25 and
microprogramming (a process that combines basic instructions into
higher and lower level instructions)26 have produced significant social
developments. Small businesses, once priced out of the computer
market, are now able to install their own computer systems. The de-
velopment of the minicomputer has greatly accelerated this trend. Al-
though these computers have the same basic hardware as their larger
counterparts, they are small, relatively inexpensive, and suitable for
general business use .2  Another major technological development
that has made computer power available to small businesses is the
practice of time sharing, whereby several businesses tie into a main
computer by means of input/output terminals. By distributing the
cost of operating the main computer, more and more businesses can
now benefit from computer technology. As a result of these develop-
ments, legal problems arising from computer use now affect the na-
tion's entire business community. Moreover, these concerns are likely
to become more widespread as computers are developed further, thereby
intensifying the need for some form of meaningful social control over
the effects of this new technology.
IV. LIABILITY OF COMPUTER USERS
The common law theory of negligence provides one basis for im-
posing liability on the computer user. Under this theory, a computer
user will be liable to a plaintiff if the quality of computer use breaches
a legal duty which the user owes to the plaintiff and which is the proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's harm.2" Although this is merely the
ordinary standard of due care, there are special problems in proving
negligence in the computer industry which merit attention.
A computer malfunction will probably occur within one or two nano-
25. Virtual storage is a process whereby memory information moves to and from
an auxiliary memory storage area to a main core storage area without interception by
the user. See F. GRUENBERGER, supra note 12, at 53.
26. See generally M. WEiC, STANDARD DICrIONARY OF COMPUTERS AND INFORMATION
PROCESSING 188 (1969).
27. Today a minicomputer costs between $8,200 and $24,000, with an average cost
of $12,000 to $15,000. This is well within the purchasing or leasing ability of many
smaller companies. Auerbach Task Force, LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN EDP 94 (1971).
28. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
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seconds (billionths of a second). Because humans are unable to
monitor these machine functions closely, proof of computer error is ex-
tremely difficult. In addition, there are few established minimum stan-
dards that govern the conduct of the computer user. Consequently,
plaintiffs who suffer injury because of a computer error will attempt
to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In order to establish a res
ipsa case, the plaintiff must show that the event-the computer error-
does not usually happen in the absence of someone's negligence; that
the instrumentality - the computer - was in the defendant's exclusive
control; and that the plaintiff did not contribute to his own injury. 20
The successful application of this doctrine to the computer field will
ultimately depend on the degree to which courts recognize the "usual
reliability" of such machines.30
A. Computer Breakdowns
In Pbrt City State Bank v. American National Bank,81 the Tenth
Circuit addressed the issue of computer reliability. The plaintiff in
Port City brought an action to recover on two checks which the defen-
dant failed to return by the appropriate deadline because of a breakdown
in its newly installed computer system. The court refused to impose
liability for negligence because the breakdown was considered an
"emergency" within the meaning of a statute that excused deadline
violations for emergency reasons,32 and because the defendant had
used due diligence in posting the checks by alternative methods and
in repairing the machine. The court apparently concluded that the ma-
chines used in this operation were not sufficiently reliable to hold the
defendant-user responsible for their breakdown. It can be inferred,
however, that the failure to act with such due diligence as the circum-
stance requires to repair a failing computer will render the user liable
for negligence."3
B. Provision for Erroneous Computer Data
Suppliers of computer-processed information may be held liable for
29. Id. § 39.
30. Id.
31. 486 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1973).
32. Id. at 200.
33. Id. at 200-01.
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providing erroneous data to those with whom they have contracted and
to third parties who reasonably rely on the erroneous information. In
Independent School District No. 454 v. Statistical Tabulating Corp.,34
the defendant (STC) had processed statistical data for Marshall and
Stevens (Marshall), a consulting firm which had contracted with plain-
tiff to appraise the value of a school building. In processing this data,
STC made some computation errors that resulted in plaintiff's building
being underinsured. The school was subsequently destroyed by fire,
and plaintiff brought an action against STC for negligence and breach
of implied warranties. In support of its motion to dismiss, defendant
argued that the school district was not in privity with STC's contract
with Marshall and therefore could not maintain an action against it.3 5
The district court denied the motion, and ruled that under Illinois law
one may be liable in negligence to another "for providing inaccurate
information which was relied on and caused economic loss, although
there was no direct contractual relationship between the parties."0 The
district court emphasized that the defendant knew of the plaintiff's in-
tended use for and reliance upon the statistical data.T Its decision,
therefore, is limited to those cases in which the third party's injury was
foreseeable by the negligent actor."' Although there is some confusion
in the law,"0 the same rule has been applied to negligent oral misrepre-
sentations made to third parties. Generally, one who negligently makes
a false representation is liable to those third parties whom he either
intends to reach and influence by the representation, has a special
reason to expect will be influenced thereby, or owes a public duty
pursuant to statute.40
34. 359 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. 1. 1973).
35. Id. at 1097.
36. Id. (emphasis added) (the district court cited Rozny v. Mamul, 43 I1.2d 54,
250 N.E.2d 656 (1969), as authority for the stated rule).
37. 359 F. Supp. at 1098.
38. The court concluded: "Recovery by a foreseeable user will promote cautionary
techniques among computer operators." Id. Accord, M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra
Coste Sanitary Dist., 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961). But see Texas
Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964) (third party cannot
recover for injuries that resulted from defendant's negligent misrepresentation of in-
formation).
39. See Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231
(1966).
40. Id. at 240-50. See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I.
1968).
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C. Reliance Upon Erroneous Computer Output
A user who relies upon a computer that has previously yielded
erroneous information may be held liable for negligence and, under
certain circumstances, be required to pay consequential or punitive
damages. A group of cases, all involving the same defendant, Ford
Motor Credit Company, illustrates the point. In Ford Motor Credit Co.
v. Hitchcock,41 Ford's computer erroneously reported that the appellee's
automobile installment account was overdue. When Ford sent one of
its agents to repossess the car, Hitchcock presented him with two
money order receipts and a copy of a cashier's check verifying that her
payments were current. Ford's accounting department had apparently
neglected to enter these payments onto its computerized accounting
ledger. The agent relayed this information to his superiors, who none-
theless directed him to take possession of the automobile.4 2 Hitchcock
subsequently brought suit for actual and exemplary damages, alleging
that the repossession had been made in "bad faith.' 43  The Georgia
Court of Appeals, in upholding the jury's award of exemplary damages,
held that the evidence supported the jury's finding that Ford's reliance
on its computer printouts was unjustified, and that its repossession of
Hitchcock's automobile was "willfully and wantonly made with full
knowledge of lack of all probable cause for so doing."'4"
Two other cases involving Ford Motor Credit Company' reached the
same result. In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Swarens,4 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals upheld the jury's award of punitive damages and com-
mented, "Trust in the infallibility of a computer is hardly a defense,
when the opportunity to avoid the error is as apparent and repeated
as was here presented. ' 47 Thus, where the computer user fails to take
41. 116 Ga. App. 563, 158 S.E.2d 468 (1967).
42. Id. at 569, 158 S.E.2d at 471.
43. Id. at 567, 158 S.E.2d at 470.
44. Id. at 565-66, 158 S.E.2d at 473. The court of appeals noted that under state
law there must be evidence of "willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, or op-
pression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious
indifference to consequences" in order to impose punitive damages. See Southern Ry.
v. O'Bryan, 119 Ga. 147, 149, 45 S.E. 1000, 1000 (1903); Central of Ga. Ry. v. Sowell,
3 Ga. App. 142, 59 S.E. 323 (1907).
45. Price v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 530 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Swarens, 447 S.W.2d 53 (Ky. 1969).
46. 447 S.W.2d 53 (Ky. 1969).
47. Id. at 57. See also Neal v. United States, 402 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.J. 1975):
The computer is a marvelous device that can perform countless tasks at high
speed and low cost, but it must be used with care. This is because it can also
make errors at high speed. Those who use computers for record and account-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/i s3/9
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reasonable precautions to determine the accuracy of computer informa-
tion, he may be not only liable for negligence, but also subject to
exemplary damages for reliance upon computer information in reckless
disregard of knowledge that it may not be accurate. 8
Reliance on faulty computer information may occasionally raise con-
stitutional questions. In Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 9 errors
in the defendant's computerized accounting system resulted in the auto-
matic termination of services to several customers. In a class action
suit for injunctive and declaratory relief and for damages, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the defen-
dant's automatic termination of utility services violated the fourteenth
amendment due process rights of plaintiff customers, who were en-
titled, at a minimum, to human intervention in the termination
process. 50
V. LIABILITY OF COMPUTER VENDORS
The phenomenal development of computer technology has created
a tremendous increase in the demand for computer equipment and ser-
vices. The sale and leasing of computer hardware equipment and
related input/output terminals, and the design and programming of
computer systems, are multi-billion dollar enterprises. What is the
liability exposure of computer hardware5' and software5 2 dealers?
ing purposes, including the government, are accordingly obliged to operate
them with suitable control to safeguard the reliability and accuracy of the in-
formation.
Id. at 680.
48. See notes 41-47 supra. See also Klingbiel v. Commercial Credit Corp., 439 F.
2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1971); Pashalian v. Big-4 Chevrolet Co., 348 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1961).
49. 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
50. 479 F.2d at 159-66. The due process aspect of this case has been limited to
its facts. Northrup v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23, 31 (6th Cir. 1975).
The Palmer court explained that the state's pervasive regulation of public utilities
brought the fourteenth amendment into play. 479 F.2d at 161-65.
51. Computer hardware is the mechanical equipment that electronically processes
data. A computer hardware system might consist of several component parts: central
processing unit, input unit, output unit, storage unit, and data transmission unit. The
central processor performs the logic and mathematical functions of the hardware system.
The input unit, which might be a card reader, magnetic tape drive, typewriter, telephone
support computer, or data storage device, furnishes the data on which the processing unit
performs its operational functions. Output units convert and present data in human
readable form for immediate or future use. See SANDERS, supra note 9, at 57, 106,
114-32.
52. Computer software refers to the programs aund routines used in conjunction withWashington University Open Scholarship
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A. Contract Liability
A contract for the sale or lease of computer hardware or software,
for computer services, or for the development of computer programs
or systems, often serves as the basis for imposing liability upon the
dealer.
1. Hardware Vendors
The liability exposure of computer hardware vendors is generally
similar to other machine vendors. Special problems may arise, how-
ever. For example, the vendor who contracts to build a special purpose
computer, or to build a computer with a novel design utilizing yet un-
developed technology, faces the problem of allocating the risks of de-
velopment. Who will bear the loss if the technological breakthrough
is not achieved?
United States v. Wegematic Corp.53 presented the Second Circuit
with such a problem. In Wegematic, the defendant contractor had sub-
mitted a bid to the Federal Reserve Board to furnish an intermediate
type, general purpose electronic digital computing system. The Fed-
eral Reserve Board had invited proposals for the production of such
a system, stressing the need for an early delivery date. The defen-
dant's proposal offered the sale or lease of a novel computer design,
which it described as "a truly revolutionary system utilizing all of the
latest technical advances,"54 and promised delivery nine months after
the contract was awarded. On the basis of this offer, the Board
computers. These programs fall into three major categories: translation, application,
and operational programs. Translation programs convert programming languages into
machine language or some other class of computer programming language. Early trans-
lation programs were written manually in machine language by the programmer, a task
that was quite tedious and intellectually exacting. With the advent of translating pro-
grams, however, the job of programming is now shifted in part to the computer itself.
Application programs process data in a manner specifically designed for a certain user
(e.g., payroll). Finally, operating programs regulate the operation of a computer by di-
recting it through its processing steps. Recent advances in operating programs have led
to the development of multiprogramming and timesharing. See notes 26-27 supra and
accompanying text.
The past decade has witnessed tremendous improvements in computer hardware and
software technology. In particular, the development of software compatibility and hard-
ware modularity has greatly expanded the use of computers. Software compatibility al-
lows a series of machines to use the same software equipment. Hardware modularity,
on the other hand, permits users to add and subtract computer capacity as it becomes
needed.
53. 1 C.L.S.R. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
54. 360 F.2d at 675.
[Vol. 1977:405
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awarded a contract for $231,800, with a delivery date of June 30, 1957,
and a liquidated damages clause requiring the defendant to pay $100
per day for delay. The contract also provided that in the event the
defendant failed to comply with any provisions of the agreement, the
Board could procure comparable equipment from another manufacturer
and charge the contractor for any excess cost incurred thereby. De-
fendant contractor accepted the contract subject to these provisions. In
mid-October 1957, the contractor announced that because of en-
gineering difficulties it would be impractical to deliver the ordered
equipment and requested cancellation of the contract without damages.
The plaintiff thereafter purchased comparable equipment from another
manufacturer, and sued the contractor for damages under the terms of
the contract. The trial court awarded the plaintiff damages of
$235,806; $46,300 for delay under the liquidated damages clause,
$179,450 for the excess cost of the replacement equipment, and
$10,056 for wasted preparation expenses."
At trial, the defendant argued that delivery was made impossible by
basic engineering difficulties, correction of which would cost one
to one and a half million dollars and would require one to two
years of work with no certainty of success. In short, defendant claimed
that the technological breakthrough required for manufacturing the
data system had not been achieved and, under applicable federal law,
the "practical impossibility" of completing the contract excused its non-
performance."0 The court held that the applicable "federal" law of
sales could be found by analogy to the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), Article 2, section 2-615, "Excuse by failure of presupposed
conditions."'57 This section excuses nondelivery under the contract
where performance "has been made impracticable by the occurrence of
a contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made . . . ," except where the seller has as-
sumed a greater obligation. The issue, then, was whether the defendant
contractor had assumed the risk of achieving the technological break-
through.ss Although the parties to the contract could have expressly
allocated the risk of development by incorporating an exculpatory
clause protecting the manufacturer, they did not do so. Absent such
a provision, and in view of the fact that the defendant had agreed to
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 676.
58. Id.
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
418 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1977:405
pay liquidated damages for any delay and had authorized the purchaser
to procure comparable machinery from other sources in the event of
nondelivery, the court held that the defendant was bound by his repres-
sentations. 9 To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would permit
manufacturers in -fields of developing technology "to express what are
only aspirations and gamble on mere probabilities of fulfillment without
any risk of liability." '6  The hardware manufacturer's failure to ex-
pressly allocate the risks of development, therefore, results in his assum-
ing liability for any failure to achieve the promised technology.
2. Software and Service Vendors
Computer software equipment 6l is usually sold in a package consist-
ing of software, services, and professional counseling by vendors. In
the landmark computer case of Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau
Corp.,62 for example, the vendee had agreed to purchase from the Ser-
vice Bureau Corporation (SBC) an automated accounting system de-
signed to perform inventory control functions. The system failed to
operate properly and overpurchased obsolete merchandise. Moreover,
because the input method was slow and expensive, the accounting
reports were too error-prone and voluminous to be of use to the vendee.
As a result, the purchasing company was forced to assign two full-time
executives to supervise the operation of the system. The company then
brought suit seeking rescission and reformation of the contract on
the grounds of breach of implied warranty, breach of contract, and
fraudulent misrepresentation. The district court denied recovery on
all grounds except the last, upon which it awarded the plaintiff damages
of $480,811.33 for losses due to inventory obsolescence, executives'
salaries, increased clerical costs, and rental costs and fees paid to
SBC and other equipment suppliers.63
The court denied plaintiff's action for breach of implied warranty
on the basis of a clause in the contract which provided: "SBC makes
no warranties, expressed or implied, other than the express war-
59. "We see no basis for thinking that when an electronics system is promoted by
its manufacturer as a revolutionary breakthrough, the risk of the revolution's occurrence
falls on the purchaser." Id.
60. Id. at 676-77.
61. See note 52 supra.
62. 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1969), affd in pertinent part, 444 F.2d 169 (8th
Cir. 1971).
63. 298 F. Supp. at 133-34, 142.https://openscholarship.w stl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss3/9
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ranties contained in this agreement." '64 Similarly, the court rejected
plaintiff's breach of contract claim because the contract merely stipu-
lated that SBC would provide certain design services, in contrast to the
broad oral representations made by SBC representatives."' Yet, even
though SBC provided the promised design services (programming and
production of reports), and the system's failure resulted from defects
with input production rather than programming, the vendor was
held liable. The court reasoned that SBC, by virtue of its broad repre-
sentation that the proposed system would "constitute an effective and
efficient tool,"6 undertook responsibility for the efficient operation of
the total system, including input production, and is therefore liable for
its failure. 7  Consequently, contracts for data processing services
should clearly state which party bears the risk for losses resulting from
errors in particular aspects of the system, including errors in input data,
accidental destruction of records, or violation of the data's security. In
addition, the contract should provide for liquidated damages for the ag-
grieved party. The inclusion of such provisions in the purchasing
agreement will often obviate the need for the injured party to prove
breach of contract or negligence.
3. Hardware and Software Vendors
In Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp.,68 the plaintiff orally
contracted with the Burroughs Corporation (Burroughs) for a computer
and programs that would produce accounting records. Both the com-
puter and programs were delivered late and, when installed, failed to
produce records in compliance with the contract. In an action for dam-
ages for breach of contract, the defendant argued that its responsibility
64. Id. at 139.
65. The court explained:
In contrast to the broad representations made by SBC, the contracts signed
by the parties merely provide that SBC will perform certain designated ser-
vices--either programming or production of reports. The contracts uniformly
provide that SBC will take due care in such work. They also expressly dis-
claim any other warranties or representations by SBC.
SM Supply asks that these contracts be construed to provide that SBC
promises to provide SM Supply inventory control. Such a broad construction
of the contracts - whether considered singly or as a whole - is not proper.
Each contract designates the services to be supplied. In light of this explicit
designation. . .SM Supply's claim must be rejected.
Id. at 140.
66. Id. at 130.
67. Id. at 131. See generally Ducker, Liability for Computer Software, 26 Bus.
LAw. 1081 (1971).
68. 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974).
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under the contract extended only to supplying machines and services
capable of producing the desired results. System failure, the vendor
pointed out, might be caused by a number of factors over which it had
no control, including the purchaser's inability to operate complex ma-
chinery. The court rejected this argument, however, and held Bur-
roughs liable for its failure to deliver a total system that produced the
expected results. 60 Cognizant of the difficulty vendees would face in
rebutting charges of incompetent operation, the court noted in dicta:
In this breach of contract suit, plaintiff might well have carried its
burden simply by proving that defendant had promised to produce a re-
sult (accounting records suitable for its purposes) and that defendant
had failed to do so, leaving it to defendant to establish, as a matter of
defense, that the errors were due to plaintiff's own personnel. 70
Given the obvious discrepancy between the expertise of vendors and
purchasers of computer hardware and software products, the procedural
approach suggested by the Beasley court is the likely and equitable ju-
dicial response.
Although the results reached in the Beasley and Clements cases are
similar, they are distinguishable in two respects. First, because
Beasley did not involve a written contract with the standard warranty
disclaimer and merger clauses, the court was able to hold that the
vendor had breached the oral contract on grounds that were very
analogous to a breach of implied warranty of fitness for purpose. 71 By
contrast, the Clements court explicitly rejected the plaintiff's implied
warranty claim, and rested its decision on the tort claim of misrepresen-
tation.72 Second, the court in Beasley may have been persuaded by
the great disparity in expertise between the vendor and the vendee.
Whereas the vendor in Clements was engaged only in the production
and sale of computer software and services, the Beasley vendor manu-
factured and marketed the computer hardware products as well as the
accompanying software equipment and services.
4. Software Vendors
The vendor of computer software can contract to provide a single
69. 361 F. Supp. at 331.
70. Id. See Note, Liability for Defects in Computer Software, 53 J. UaB. L. 279,
281-84 (1975).
71. 361 F. Supp. at 331-34.
72. See notes 62-67 supra and accompanying text.
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computer program or a series of programs that constitute a system.
The parties to such an agreement anticipate that the program or system
will be used on the vendee's computer. The operation of the system,
therefore, is dependent upon persons other than the vendor.
In Sanitary Linen Services Co. v. Alexander Proudfoot, Co.," the
defendant, a vendor of computer programs, agreed to aid the plaintiff
in the "installation of schedule and method improvements designed to
provide greater control over utilization of man and machine hours and
to effect operating economies. '' 7 Under the terms of the contract, the
vendor was to produce a "workable system" with savings accruing. 75
The system failed to perform as expected, and the plaintiff brought suit
alleging both breach of contract and breach of express and implied war-
ranties. The court, finding for the vendee, held that although there
could be no implied warranties in a contract for personal services, the
savings that resulted from the system were minimal; consequently,
the vendor failed to perform its promise to provide a workable sys-
tem. The court concluded:
Proudfoot has maintained throughout that what it was selling was serv-
ices and not results. The district court found that there were some
slight benefits from Proudfoot's activities. We conclude that these
savings or benefits were not of any consequence in determining whether
the service of developing and installing a system was accomplished as
promised. They did not rise to the level of preventing the failure of
consideration from being material."6
Beasley and Sanitary Linen established that a vendor who simply
fails to produce the promised results might be liable to the software
purchaser for breach of contract or failure of consideration. 77 In so rul-
ing, the courts have adopted the purchaser's perception of the agree-
ment and rejected the seller's contention that he is a mere purveyor
of a service. The purpose of the contract - i.e., successful results for
the purchasers-may provide the key to determine who should bear the
risk of system failure.
73. 304 F. Supp. 339 (S.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970).
74. 435 F.2d at 293.
75. Id. at 294.
76. Id.
77. See also Burroughs Business Machs., Ltd. v. Feed-Rite Mills, Ltd., 42 D.L.R.
3d 303, 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. [C.L.S.R.] 885 (Man. Ct. App. Can. 1973); Ducker,
supra note 67.
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5. Contractual Limitations of Liability
a) Effective Limitations
The leading case dealing with the contractual limitation of liability
is Farris Engineering Corp. v. Service Bureau Corp.78  In Farris, plain-
tiff contracted with Service Bureau Corporation (SBC) for a complete
and accurate inventory computation system that would compute total
inventory costs and other accounting figures such as material, time,
labor, and overhead unit costs. After SBC had performed its services
under the contract but before payment, the purchaser brought suit al-
leging that SBC had breached the contract by making numerous errors
and by failing to perform within the agreed time schedule. The
written contract contained an exculpatory provision that limited dam-
ages to the contract price and excluded any liability for consequential
or exemplary damages. Based on this provision, the court denied the
plaintiff's claim for damages arising out of the faulty operation of the
data processing system and for additional expenses incurred as a result
of the breach. The district court noted that under New Jersey law
exculpatory clauses in private agreements are valid so long as they do
not adversely affect the public interest.7 9 Thus, in states such as New
Jersey, vendors may effectively limit their liability by including an ex-
culpatory clause in the contract.
Liquidated damage clauses provide another means by which the
computer vendor can limit his liability. In the Wegematic case, the dis-
trict court commented upon the utility of such clauses:
There is authority to the effect that where the parties to a contract have
specified that a certain amount of liquidated damages are to be paid
in the event of a certain breach or breaches such provision fixes the
damages that are reasonable for such breach or breaches and the party
injured may not, in addition, recover actual damages sustained in excess
of the amount or amounts fixed. 80
Rules and regulations promulgated by a public utility illustrate an
additional method by which some suppliers of computer services may
78. 276 F. Supp. 643 (D.N.J. 1967), ajj'd, 406 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1969).
79. 276 F. Supp. at 645. See also Hunt v. Perkins Mach. Co., 352 Mass. 535, 226
N.E.2d 228 (1967); Note, supra note 70, at 285.
80. 1 C.LS.R. 341, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aIf'd, 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966). See
notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text.
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limit their liability.8' In Waters v. Pacific Telephone Co.,82 a real
estate broker brought an action for damages against the Pacific Tele-
phone Company (Pacific) for failure to furnish adequate services in
violation of section 451 of the California Public Utilities Code.83
Pacific's alleged acts of negligence included lack of proper maintenance
services, incompleted calls, unauthorized removal of phones, improper
installation of phones, and a variety of other "frustrating experiences"
stated in plaintiff's complaint.8 4
Pacific argued that under paragraph 14(a) of its tariff schedule,85
the customer is entitled to recover a "credit allowance" only for the
period that the customer's telephone is out of service. The, Supreme
Court of California agreed and stated:
[T]he (Public Utilities) Commission has adopted a policy of limiting the
liability of telephone utilities such as Pacific for acts of ordinary negli-
gence to a specified credit allowance, as set forth in approved tariff
schedules which form a contract with telephone service customers.
81. Telephone companies promise to be a major channel for data communication
among computer users. Because of the highly regulated nature of this utility, individual
contract negotiations with customers are unlikely; thus, liability limiting devices are of-
ten incorporated into the utility's rules and regulations and registered with a public
utilities commission. See Cole v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 112 Cal. App. 2d 416, 417,
246 P.2d 686, 687 (1952).
82. 12 Cal. 3d 1, 523 P.2d 1161, 114 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1974).
83. CAL Pun. UTn. CODE § 451 (Deering Supp. 1977) provides in pertinent part:
Every public utility shall furnish and maintain such adequate, efficient, just,
and reasonable service, instrumentalities, equipment, and facilities as are neces-
sary to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience of its patrons, em-
ployees, and the public.
All rules made by a public utility affecting or pertaining to its charges or
service to the public shall be just and reasonable.
84. 12 Cal.3d at 5, 523 P.2d at 1163, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
85. Paragraph 14(a) of Pacific's tariff schedule, filed with and approved by the
[Public Utilities] [Clommission, and incorporated into Pacific's contract with plaintiff,
provided... :
"14. INTERRUPTIONS AND FAILURES OF SERVICE
"(a) Credit Allowance for Interruption to Service
"Upon request of the subscriber the Company will allow subscribers credit
in all cases where telephones are 'out of service,' except when the 'out of ser-
vice' is due to the fault of the subscriber, for periods of one day or more from
the time the fact is reported by the subscriber or detected by the Company, of
an amount equal to the total fixed monthly charges for exchange service multi-
plied by the ratio of the number of days 'out of service' to the number of calen-
dar days in the billing month.
"A day 'out of service' will be considered to exist when service is not
available for a period of twenty-four consecutive hours. When any 'out of
service' period continues for a period in excess of an even multiple of twenty-
four hours, then the total period upon which to determine the credit allowance
will be taken to the next higher even twenty-four hour multiple.Washington University Open Scholarship
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Since an award of substantial damages to plaintiff would be contrary to
the policy adopted by the commission and would interfere with the com-
mission's regulation of telephone utilities, we have concluded that...
the instant action (for damages). . was properly dismissed. 80
In reaching this result, the court relied heavily on a California statute
that limited its review of any order or decision of the Public Utilities
Commission to a writ of mandamus.8 7  Consequently, the Waters de-
cision may not apply in other states. It does suggest, however, that
regulated industries may restrict their liability for ordinary negligence
arising out of their computer-dependent operations by adopting limiting
devices such as credit allowances and adjusting their rates accordingly.
b) Ineffective Limitations on Liability
A limitation of liability clause in a contract may be ineffective if a
court finds that the actual agreement made by the parties is broader
than the written instrument. In Beasley,88 for example, the defendant
attempted to limit his liability by inserting an exculpatory clause in the
written contract excluding liability for consequential damages. Al-
though the written contract related only to the sale of computer hard-
ware, the jury found that the actual agreement between the parties ex-
tended to software equipment and services as well, and that the excul-
patory clause did not apply to these items; accordingly, consequential
damages relating to this aspect of the transaction were permitted.,"
Thorton v. Shoe Lane Parking, Ltd.,"0 an English case relevant by
analogy to computer contracts problems, illustrates another instance in
which liability disclaimers may prove ineffective. In Thorton, the
plaintiff pulled into a parking lot driveway and placed his money in a
"In no case will the credit allowance for any period exceed the total fixed
charges for exchange service for that period."
12 Cal. 3d at 5 n.4, 523 P.2d at 1163 n.4, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 755 n.4 (emphasis added
by court).
86. 12 Cal.3d at 4, 523 P.2d at 1162, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
87. CAL. PuB. UnL. CODE § 1759 (Deering Supp. 1977) provides that:
No court of this State, except the Supreme Court to the extent specified in this
article, shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any order
or decision of the commission or to suspend or delay the execution or opertion
thereof, or to enjoin, restrain, or interfere with the commission in the per-
formance of its official duties, except that the writ of mandamus shall lie from
the Supreme Court to the commission in all proper cases.
88. 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd mem., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974).
89. 361 F. Supp. at 332-34.
90. [1971] 2 W.L.R. 585, 4 C.L.S.R. 641 (C.A. 1970).
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machine that issued a parking ticket. The printed contract on the back
of the ticket stated that the "agreement" was subject to several condi-
tions posted inside the lot. One of these conditions limited the parking
lot owner's liability. The court held that the ticket did not provide
Thorton with sufficient notice of the conditions to bind him, and noted:
The customer pays his money and gets a ticket. He cannot refuse it.
• . . He may protest to the machine, even swear at it. But it will re-
main unmoved. He is committed beyond recall. He was committed
at the very moment when he puts his money into the machine. 9 '
It may be argued, therefore, that where machines or computers dis-
pense contracts and function as virtual contracting agents, conditional
clauses such as liability limitations may be ineffective because the
requisite notice to the other party is lacking.
In addition, contractual provisions negating liability for certain types
of risks may be unenforceable as against a state public policy.9" For
example, the defendant in Clements92 argued that a contract provision
excluding liability for special or consequential damages applied to fraud
actions based on innocent misrepresentations. The defendant con-
tended that such fraud actions do not contain an element of bad faith 4
and should therefore be treated in the same manner as breach of con-
tract actions, in which provisions excluding consequential damages had
been consistently upheld. The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument
and held that Minnesota's avowed public policy in favor of providing
effective remedies for fraud rendered such provisions ineffective.9
Hence, in states such as Minnesota there is no effective contractual
method of limiting liability for this type of risk.96
91. Id. at 588, 4 C.L.S.R. at 644.
92. See, e.g., Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115 (D.
Minn. 1969), afrd in pertinent part, 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971) (exculpatory clause
held inapplicable against fraud action). But see National Cash Register Co. v. Modem
Transfer Co., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 138, 302 A.2d 486 (1973) (exculpatory clause held
effective against fraud claim where clause contradicted alleged fraudulent representation
and where plaintiff failed to aver that alleged misrepresentation was fraudulently omitted
from written contract).
93. 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1969), aff'd in pertinent part, 444 F.2d 169 (8th
Cir. 1971).
94. Minnesota is one of the few states that permits recovery for innocent misrepre-
sentations. The trend, however, is clearly in favor of such a claim. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 28, at 710.
95. 444 F.2d at 188-89.
96. See generally Philpott, Imposing Liability on Data Processing Services - Should
California Choose Fraud or Warranty?, 13 SANTA CLARA LAw. 140, 152-53 (1972).
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6. Computer Waiver of Legal Rights
Suppose an event occurs that gives one party the right to rescind the
contract but that party's computer, following previous instructions, per-
forms an act that affirms the contract. What if the party had decided
to rescind? Does the computer in these cases act as the contracting
agent of the user? Do the doctrines of estoppel or waiver apply to bind
the computer user to a contract he neither intended nor desired?
Finally, what liability does the computer user in such situations incur?
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Brockhorst,0 7 the
defendant was involved in an automobile accident at 12:45 a.m. on
October 4, 1969. This accident occurred about one and a half months
after the defendant had defaulted on his premium payments and his
insurance policy had lapsed. Brockhurst immediately mailed a check
for the amount owing on his policy and personally reported his actions
to his agent. The agent explained the facts to his superiors and
forwarded the defendant's check to the main office. When the insur-
ance company's computer received the check, it automatically rein-
stated his policy retroactively as of 12:01 a.m., October 4, 1969, forty-
four minutes before the accident occurred. State Farm subsequently
refunded Brockhorst's premium, stating that no coverage of any type
was available to him, and sued for a nonliabiity declaratory judgment.
The court held that because the defendant had not concealed any of
the facts, and because State Farm had knowledge of both the time of
the accident and the mailing of the premium check, the insurance com-
pany had waived its right to refuse reinstatement when the computer
issued a new policy extending coverage prior to the time of the acci-
dent.98 The court reasoned:
A computer operates only in accordance with the information and direc-
tions supplied by its human programmers. If the computer does not
think like a man, it is man's fault. The reinstatement of Brockhorst's
policy was the direct result of the errors and oversights of State Farm's
human agents and employees. The fact that the actual processing of
the policy was carried out by an unimaginative mechanical device can
have no effect on the company's responsibilities for those errors and
oversights. State Farm's reinstatement of Brockhorst's policy while in
97. 453 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1972).
98. Id. at 535. See also Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bobo, 214 F.2d 575
(4th Cir. 1954) (retention of premium payment beyond thirty days grace period); Ala-
bama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 272 Ala. 574, 133 So. 2d 221 (1961)
(retention of delinquent premium payments with full knowledge of accident during
[Vol. 1977:405
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full possession of information establishing its right to refuse reinstate-
ment constituted a binding waiver, and the reinstated policy effectively
extended coverage for the period during which Brockhorst's accident
occurred. 99
Such cases often turn on whether there are sufficient facts from
which a judge or jury can infer an intent to waive the right to rescind
the contract.10 A series of New York cases illustrate the difficulties
in proving the requisite intent. In Johnson v. Mutual Benefit Health &
Accident Association'0 ' and Prudential Insurance Company of America
v. Brown,1" two New York state courts reached opposite conclusions
on the issue of waiver notwithstanding essentially identical fact patterns
in both cases. The relevant facts were: (1) the insured's application
contained a material misrepresentation pertaining to the insured's
health; (2) the insurer learned of this misrepresentation and returned
to the insured his prior premium payments; (3) because of an error in
some mechanical procedure, an automatic notice of somes sort was
sent to an insured by a business machine (in Johnson a premium notice
was sent; in Brown two dividend notices were sent); and (4) in both
cases, a premium was accepted by mistake and retained because the
insurer felt it would be futile to return it.
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, noted in Johnson that the issuance of a premium payment notice
was "cogent evidence of an intent to abandon rescission."' 0 3 The court
observed:
The demand ...for the payment of a premium, and the acceptance
and retention of the same by the company, must be considered as evi-
dence of a waiver of the right to rescind in the absence of a more con-
vincing explanation . . . .The only argument on the part of the appel-
lant to explain the demand and acceptance of the premium is to the
period of default); American Natl Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 169 Colo. 420, 458 P.2d 257
(1969) (retention of delinquent premiums with full knowledge of accident during period
of default); Van Hulle v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 44 111. 2d 227, 254 N.E.2d 457
(1969) (acceptance of past due premium with notice of loss).
99. 453 F.2d at 537.
100. Waiver is "essentially a matter of intention." Alsens Am. Portland Cement
Works v. Degnon Contracting Co., 222 N.Y. 34, 37, 118 N.E. 210, 210 (1917) quoted
in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Brown, 30 Misc. 2d 147, 215 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
See Gutman v. United States Cas. Co., 241 App. Div. 752, 753, 270 N.Y.S. 160, 161
(1934) ("[w]hether a waiver has occurred is a matter of intention").
101. 5 App. Div. 2d 103, 168 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1957), modified on other grounds, 5
N.Y.2d 1031, 158 N.E.2d 251, 185 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1959).
102. 30 Misc. 2d 147, 215 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
103. 5 App. Div. at 107, 168 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
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effect that the company is a large one and the incident was an inter-
departmental mistake.10 4
Three years later, however, the New York Supreme Court, West-
chester County, in Brown, found the Johnson rationale unpersuasive.
Under the test established in Brown, waiver requires conduct that consti-
tutes "a deliberate recognition of the policy. '' 1°5 The evidence must
demonstrate a voluntary choice to waive a right, and "[nhegligence, over-
sight, or thoughtlessness does not create it."' 00 Because the electronic
"error" that caused the issuance of the individual notices fell into this
latter category, the insured had failed to establish the requisite in-
tent. 0 7 The Brown court, however, failed to distinguish or even
mention the prior decision in Johnson. To add to the confusion, the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, in
Garbin v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 08 approved Johnson and held
that an insurer who had accepted premium payments after discovering
the insured's misrepresentation waived his right to rescind the contract.
Although the Supreme Court in Garbin reversed the lower court hold-
ing based on Brown, it failed to distinguish the cases. Garbin's facts
were substantially more favorable than either of the prior cases to a
finding of knowing waiver; 09 it is arguable, however, that there are
no valid distinctions that can be drawn between the Johnson and Brown
cases. Consequently, liability may be incurred because a computer
program is not set up to cut-off premium notices, reject premium
payments, or otherwise handle contractual relations in accordance with
the intentions of the computer user. Proving an intent to waive the
right to rescind, however, may require more than the fact that the com-
puter issued the contract.
7. Computer Estoppel
Contractual obligations can also result from an application of the doc-
104. Id. at 106-07, 168 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
105. 30 Misc. 2d at 151, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
106. Id. at 150, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 656 (quoting Alsens Am. Portland Cement Works
v. Degnon Contracting Co., 222 N.Y. 34, 37, 118 N.E. 210, 210 (1917)).
107. Id.
108. 75 Misc. 2d 552, 348 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 77 Misc. 2d 689,
356 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
109. In Garbin, the insured had materially misrepresented several facts about his
medical history on companion medical insurance policies. Although the insurer dis-
covered the misrepresentation thirteen months before the insured's death, it continued
to demand, accept, and retain quarterly pension payments. The court rejected de-
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trine of estoppel. "A waiver is a voluntary act of election between two
or more courses of action. An estoppel, on the other hand, is an abate-
ment of rights through the intervention of law because of equitable
considerations; it contemplates an act to the prejudice of one party in
reliance on the conduct of another" before it will be applied. 110 In
the insurance cases discussed above, the insureds could have asserted
the doctrine of estoppel if they had detrimentally relied on the in-
surer's acceptance of the premiums."' The doctrine was success-
fully applied in Colonial Life & Insurance Co. v. Wilson.112  In
Colonial Life, the defendant was insured by the plaintiff under an
"Executive and Professional Accident Policy." The policy was paid
each year by a set of "Series Checks" which were issued by the insurer
on IBM cards and signed and returned by the insured. One check was
cashed each month by the insured for that month's premium. Colonial
Life repeatedly assured Wilson that his policy would remain in force
so long as he signed and returned each series check. If the check was
sent by mail, it had to be postmarked by the last day of the grace
period. Late notices sent by the company after the first of each month
contained the statement, "If these checks have already been mailed
please disregard this notice.""13
In an action for a nonliability declaratory judgment, the jury found
that although Wilson signed and mailed the checks in the latter part
of July and August, Colonial Life did not receive them. This resulted
in the cancellation of his policy." 4 Under the general rule, unless a
premium check is expressly accepted as payment, it is only conditional
payment until honored and paid on presentment.1"5 Colonial Life was
estopped from asserting the claim of conditional payment, however, be-
cause of its assurances to Wilson that signing and mailing the checks
would be sufficient to keep the policy in force. The statement con-
fendant's explanation that failure to cancel the policies was due to inadvertence. 77
Misc. 2d at 690, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
110. 30 Misc. 2d at 149, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 655. See 16 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW ANDa PRACTnCE, § 9081 (1944).
111. See, e.g., Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Howell, 225 Or. 71, 357 P.2d 400 (1961),
overruled on other grounds, Bunn v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 257 Or. 409, 478 P.2d
363 (1970).
112. 246 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958).
113. Id. at 926.
114. Id.
115. See 3A A. CORaIN, CoaIN ON CoNTACrs §§ 633, 635 (1960).
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tained in the late notice reinforced Wilson's claim that he had no knowl-
edge of the cancellation. The court stated:
If there are risks involved in this system, it is the Insurer's system
to alter. If the risk of this system, or that of possible perjury by in-
terested parties outweighs the evident savings in personnel and operat-
ing costs which leads its executives to declare that the procedure is
highly beneficial to it, the Insurer can change it. The Insurer can
refrain from advising the Assureds that mailing of checks will assure
"that your policy will be kept in force for another twelve months' period"
or that "by signing and returning these checks today, you can be assured
that your future is protected." Until that is done, the Assured, un-
aware that his "Series Checks" have gone astray, if he complies with
those directions, has the benefits of those assurances. 11
The doctrines of estoppel and waiver may also be applicable to a
computer purchasing contract. In Associated Tabulating Service, Inc.
v. Olympic Life Insurance Co.," 7 the defendant was a fledgling insur-
ance company not yet involved in the actual selling of insurance
policies. Associated Tabulating Service (Associated), a computer ser-
vice bureau, performed data processing services for several insurance
companies. Olympic Life was in the market for such services and after
some negotiations and exchange of letters and proposals, Olympic Life
and Associated began doing business. Associated charged the defend-
ant five dollars per policy for its services, a price that allowed for the
ammortization over five years of the original cost of the data process-
ing operation. Although this was a contract term mentioned during nego-
tiations, no formal contract was ever entered into. One and one-half
months after services began, Olympic abruptly halted the business re-
lationship. Associated thereupon sued for breach of contract and reliance
damages under a theory of promissory estoppel. The court awarded the
reliance damages and found that Olympic "by its words and conduct...
made promises or assurances to Associated which led it reasonably to
believe that it had a five year contract for the data processing."'"18  Al-
though Olympic was probably too inexperienced to understand the
nature of its data processing relationship with Associated, it was never-
theless held liable for its conduct.
In another case involving the doctrine of estoppel, liability was
incurred for the purchase of a computer hardware system, even though
116. 246 F.2d at 928-29.
117. 414 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1969).
118. Id. at 1311.
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that system never performed its intended functions. In National Cash
Register Co. v. Marshall Savings & Loan Association,1 9 the defendant
contracted with National Cash Register (NCR) for the purchase and
installation of an electronic data processing system. The contract pro-
vided for payment as soon as NCR delivered, installed, and certified
that the system was ready for use. NCR completed installation and
certified by a letter to Marshall that the computer system had been de-
livered, installed, tested, and was available for use. The final step of
converting Marshall's data for use in the system was never completed,
however. This prevented defendant from commencing day to day op-
erations; Marshall refused to pay until total conversion was accom-
plished, and NCR sued for breach of contract.
The court held that although the installed system could not be used
until the data's conversion was completed, Marshall, by neither disput-
ing nor rejecting the certification letter, was estopped from now claim-
ing that the system was not "ready for use."'120 NCR, the court found,
had taken the position at the time of the transaction that "ready for
use" meant when the system was physically installed.12' Marshall had
unequivocally accepted that interpretation of the contract term when
it failed to object to the letter of certification at the time it was sent.
The purchaser was liable, therefore, for the entire purchase price of
a data processing system it could not operate. Thus, a computer pur-
chaser (or seller) may be estopped from pursuing an otherwise valid
claim for goods and services by its prior words or conduct.
B. Warranty Liability
Warranties can also create liability for hardware and software
vendors, and may arise under either Article 2 of the U.C.C.12 2 or
under the common law doctrines of express and implied warranties.
1. Express Warranties
Express warranties have thus far had a limited application to the
computer field because vendors rarely include such provisions in their
purchasing contracts. Section 2-313(1)(a) of the U.C.C. defines an
express warranty: "Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the
119. 415 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1969).
120. Id. at 1132-33.
121. Id. at 1133.
122. Express warranties are covered by U.C.C., Article 2, § 2-313 (1972 version).
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seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promise." In those cases, therefore,
where a hardware or software vendor represents such things as speed
of calculation, memory capacity, or type of language used, the pur-
chaser should be able to recover for breach of express warranty if the
enumerated features are not satisfactory. If other features fail to per-
form, however, the express warranty may be interpreted by the court
as a limitation precluding recovery for the nonperformance of all items
except those expressly warranted in the contract.12 3
2. Implied Warranties
The U.C.C. creates two types of implied warranties: section 2-314
provides: "[A] warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is
implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind.' 1 24  And section 2-315 establishes:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any par-
ticular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is
relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suit-
able goods, there is unless excluded or modified . . . an implied war-
ranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.' 25
Such warranties arise from the act of making the sale, and are inde-
pendent of any oral or written agreements. 2  As such, they are im-
plied in every sale of computer "goods" unless expressly excluded or
modified. 127
The first issue, therefore, is whether computer software is a "good"
under the appropriate provision of the U.C.C. Section 2-105(1)
defines goods as "all things (including specially manufactured goods)
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale."
See note 123 infra and accompanying text. Implied warranties are of two types: mer-
chantability, covered by U.C.C. § 2-314 (1972 version), and fitness for particular
purpose, U.C.C. § 2-315 (1972 version). See notes 124-126 and 133-136 infra and ac-
companying text.
123. See, e.g., Honeywell Information Sys., Inc. v. Demographic Sys., Inc., 396
F. Supp. 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (express warranty to repair or replace defective equip-
ment held good defense against claim of poor performance).
124. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1972 version).
125. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1972 version).
126. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1972 version). See Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply
Corp., 337 F.2d 363, 368 (5th Cir. 1964).
127. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1972 version).
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Relying on this provision, the court in Computer Servicenters, Inc. v.
Beacon Manufacturing Co. 12' held that data processing was a service
rather than a "good" and therefore not subject to implied warranty lia-
bility under the U.C.C. Although the court did not address the status of
computer software equipment and system development transactions in
general, the decision in Computer Servicenters suggests that courts
might be restrictive in their interpretation of the term "goods" as ap-
plied to data processing and similar contracts."'
Even though the subject matter may be a good under section
2-105(1), the nature of the computer transaction may remove it from
the scope of Article 2. In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.
v. Starline Overseas Corp.,"' the plaintiff contracted to purchase a
computer from a defendant-designated seller and to lease it to the de-
fendant for five years and five months at a fixed monthly rental of
$274.20. After three years the defendant defaulted, claiming that the
machine had become inoperable. In an action for rent due on the
balance of the contract, the defendant charged in his counterclaim that
the transaction was within Article 2."1' The court held that the agree-
ment was a title retention and lease governed by Article 9 of the U.C.C.
rather than a sale of goods under Article 2; accordingly, it rejected de-
fendant's counterclaim and observed, "Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code-(Sales) . . . expressly excludes from the application of
its provisions . . . 'any transaction which although in the form of an
unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only
as a security transaction.' 132 Thus, the type of transaction intended
by the parties has a significant bearing on what legal protections will
apply.
If the transaction falls within the scope of Article 2, the implied
warranty for purpose' 33 provides the purchaser with one of his most ef-
fective safeguards. This warranty applies if the court finds that the
seller had reason to know, at the time of the transaction, of a particular
purpose for which the goods were to be used. Thus, if the seller par-
128. 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971).
129. See McGonigal, Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Software Con-
tracts, in 2 Computer L. Serv. § 3-3 Art. 4 (1974).
130. 74 Misc. 2d 898, 346 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. CL 1973), aff'd mem., 45 App. Div.
2d 99, 360 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1974).
131. Id. at 900, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
132. Id. at 901, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
133. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1972 version). See note 125 supra.
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ticipates in the installation of the purchaser's data processing system by
recommending equipment, performing design work, or furnishing pro-
grams, courts are more likely to infer an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose; the cooperating seller in such circumstances
is presumed to know of the particular purpose for which the computer
equipment, program, or system is to be used.' 3 '
In Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp.,'85 the Fifth Circuit
addressed the question of whether a vendor of computer products could
be liable for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose notwithstanding the incorporation of an express warranty
clause in the written contract. In Industrial Supply, appellee had in-
formed several computer manufacturers that it was interested in pur-
chasing an electronic recordkeeping system. The appellant made a
survey of Industrial's operation, and recommended a Univac Electronic
Computer, which Industrial agreed to purchase. The computer subse-
quently malfunctioned, and the purchaser brought an action against the
seller for breach of contract. The written agreement contained both
an integration clause and an express warranty covering adjustments and
replacement of defective parts, which, the seller argued, excluded
the application of any implied warranties. The court rejected this claim
and held that because the subject of the express warranty was not in-
consistent with the asserted implied warranty of fitness for use, recovery
under the implied warranty was not barred.18  Because Sperry Rand
had surveyed Industrial's particular needs, it was liable for breach of
implied warranty, in spite of contract limitations calculated to prevent
such liability.
There are valid ways, nevertheless, for the computer vendor to limit
his liability for implied warranties. Section 2-316(2) of the U.C.C.
permits disclaimers of the implied warranty of merchantability, but re-
quires that such disclaimers specifically mention '"merchantability" and,
in the case of a writing, be conspicuous.137 Implied warranties of fit-
134. See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 37 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.
1964). See generally Note, supra note 70, at 291.
135. 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964).
136. The court reasoned:
[While there may be a valid express disclaimer of an implied warranty, the
right to assert such a warranty is not precluded by express warranties which
are not inconsistent, and since the implied warranty arises independently of the
contract of sale, it is not to be rejected because of an integration clause.
Id. at 371.
137. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1972 version) provides:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
[Vol. 1977:405
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ness for a particular purpose also may be excluded by general language,
but only if it is in writing and conspicuous." 8  In addition, section
2-316(3)(b) operates to negate implied warranties "when the buyer
before entering into the contract has examined the goods . . . as fully
as he desired or has refused to examine the goods . . . [when] an ex-
amination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him [any
defects]."'-O
C. Tort Liability
The vendor of computer hardware and software products may also
incur liability for his negligence or intentionally tortious conduct, or by
virtue of the application of strict liability doctrines.
1. Misrepresentation
The law of misrepresentation provides purchasers of computer prod-
ucts with an additional cause of action for damages arising out of their
computer transactions. This tort claim may be based upon an intent
to deceive, negligence, or strict liability,140and requires proof that the
seller's representations were false, material, and reasonably relied upon
by the purchaser.14 ' In addition, partial disclosures that convey a false
impression about a material aspect of the transaction may constitute
misrepresentation, rendering the seller liable for his omissions. 42
In Strand v. Librascope, Inc., 43 recovery for misrepresentation was
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability
and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.
Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states,
for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the descrip-
tion on the face hereof."
See Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
138. See Reeves Soundcraft Corp., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 210, 1 C.L.S.R. 285 (A.S.B.C.A.
1964).
139. Implied warranties also arise from the common law, but because the relevant
sections of the Code provide broader protections, the common law implied warranty is
rarely applied. For a discussion of computer software under Article 2, see Note, supra
note 70, at 291-96 and cases cited therein.
140. A small but growing number of states have adopted strict liability for innocent
misrepresentations. See note 94 supra.
141. See W. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 699-720.
142. See Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U.S. 410, 425-26
(1941); Strand v. Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743, 753-54 (E.D. Mich. 1961). See
generally 1 F. HARPER AND W. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS 586-88 (1956).
143. 197 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
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based on the defendant vendor's failure to make a full disclosure re-
garding its product's stage of development. Strand, a private citizen en-
gaged in the manufacture of digital computers, contracted with defend-
ant to purchase several hundred magnetic read/record heads to be used
in constructing an electronic digital computer. The vendor, Libra-
scope, was an experienced manufacturer of computer components and
knew of Strand's particular needs. Based on Strand's specifications,
Librascope recommended its MH-10R magnetic head. It failed to dis-
close, however, that this head was experimental and had a tendency
to develop "noise" and "crosstalk," and that more reliable alternatives
were available. Moreover, defendant's engineers repeatedly insisted,
even after Strand had informed them that he was experiencing "noise
problems" with the head, that his troubles were caused by mistakes in
his system's design rather than any defect in their product. The
court found these acts and omissions by Librascope to be deceptive and,
under Michigan law, held the corporation liable for misrepresenta-
tion.14 4
The court found several considerations decisive in determining
whether defendant's misrepresentations were material. Librascope, as
an experienced manufacturer, possessed superior knowledge and ex-
pertise in the field of electronic digital computers and had more famili-
arity with component equipment than Strand.145 Furthermore, the
defendant had within its exclusive possession certain complex technical
information relating to the research and development of the new record
head. Finally, it knew of plaintiff's particular needs and specifications,
and was aware of the great reliance plaintiff placed upon its knowledge,
honesty, and good faith. In view of these circumstances, the court
found that elementary fair conduct required complete disclosure by
Librascope of the state of development of its new product, "since such
disclosure was necessary to prevent Strand from drawing conceptions
or inferences known by Librascope to be unwarranted."14
144. Id. at 755. The district court noted that under Michigan law "the plaintiff
must show that the misrepresentations were material, as measured by an objective stan-
dard, and that he did, in fact, rely upon them." Hall v. Johnson, 41 Mich. 286, 289, 2
N.W. 55, 57 (1879). See note 94 supra.
145. 197 F. Supp. at 752, 754. See Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298
F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1969), af'd in pertinent part, 444 F.2d 169, 183 (8th Cir.
1971) ("The Minnesota Court has frequently looked to the relative knowledge of the
parties in determining whether reliance on the representation was justified.").
146. 197 F. Supp. at 752-53,
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In Fruit Industries Research Foundation v. National Cash Register
Co.,117 on the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that where a purchaser knew of certain inadequacies in the
operation of a vendor's computer before purchase, it had no right to
rely upon the vendor's misrepresentations concerning those inade-
quacies. 4 1  This result is consistent with the decision in Strand. The
court in Fruit Industries emphasized the computer expertise of the pur-
chaser and his ability to foresee the particular deficiencies that arose. 4 '
It concluded that since this business transaction, unlike that in Strand,
was conducted by "two sophisticated businessmen, dealing at arm's
length," the purchaser's alleged reliance upon the misrepresentations
of the seller was unjustified.' 5
The court in Fruit Industries also denied recovery for defendant's
alleged misrepresentation that plaintiff would obtain enough customers
to operate the new system profitably.-3' The court ruled that this was
not a misrepresentation of an existing fact but a present statement of
intent precluding recovery.' 52  This result seems to contradict the de-
cision in the Clements case,' 3 in which the vendor was held liable for
his misrepresentations regarding the predicted or intended results of
the system's design.' 5 " The court in Clements reached its result, how-
ever, by viewing the proposed computer system as one product and
statements about that system as descriptions of its inherent capabili-
ties.', 5 Even under this view, the statement in the Fruit Industries case
147. 406 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1969).
148. Id. at 549. The court held that Washington's general policy of allowing re-
covery for fraud despite the victim's negligence in relying on the misrepresentations did
not apply where the victim knew the facts allegedly misrepresented to be false. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. The court explained that such promises "cannot satisfy the first necessary ele-
ment of actionable fraud, misrepresentation of an existing fact, unless there existed a
present intent not to attempt the future fulfillment of the promises." (citations omitted).
Id. at 549-50. See W. PRossmE, supra note 28, at 720; Keeton, Fraud - Misrepresenta-
tion of Opinion, 21 MINN. L. REv. 643 (1937).
153. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1969),
ajf'd in pertinent part, 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971). See notes 62-67 supra and ac-
companying text.
154. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
155. 444 F.2d at 181. Although the vendor's statement that the proposed system
would "constitute an effective tool to be used in inventory control" could be construed
as a prediction of what the system will do, the court held that under Minnesota law
it was also "a statement of inherent capabilities of a partipular product." Id.
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does not fall into the same category: in Clements, the product had to
supply a service, whereas in Fruit Industries, the seller did.
The Clements court also held that the merger and liability limitation
clauses contained in the purchasing contract did not insulate the vendor
from liability for his material misrepresentations. 15  Therefore, the
court admitted evidence concerning those representations which would
have been excluded by the parole evidence rule if the action had
sounded in contract.1 57 Under the governing Minnesota decisions, the
parole evidence rule precludes the admission of evidence concerning
fraudulent representations only where the contract provision contradicts
the alleged misrepresentation. 58
2. Negligence
The general law of negligence, when applied to the computer
industry, raises some difficult but interesting problems. Negligence
has been defined as the "failure to do what the reasonable man would
do under the same or similar circumstances."159 Although the applica-
tion of this standard of reasonable care is as "wide as all human be-
havior,"''10 the standard itself is community-related, and evidence of the
usual conduct of others under similar circumstances is generally rele-
vant and admissible.' 0 ' Thus, if the computer vendor does what every-
one else in the industry has done, there is at least an inference that
his conduct conforms to the standard of reasonableness. In the young
and dynamic field of computers, however, no usual or customary mode
of behavior for computer vendors has yet developed. Consequently,
there is no real community standard against which the vendor's conduct
can be measured. This applies to the acts and omissions of computer
manufacturers and vendors, both in providing computer-related services
and in constructing and designing their hardware and software products.
156. Id. at 177-180. See National Equipment Corp. v. Volden, 190 Minn. 596, 252
N.W. 444 (1934). See also Applied Data Processing, Inc., v. Burroughs Corp., 394
F. Supp. 504 (D. Conn. 1975) (liquidated damage clause held ineffective to limit conse-
quential damages arising out of vendor's fraud).
157. 444 F.2d at 178-79.
158. Id. at 179. See National Cash Register Co. v. Modern Transfer Co., 224 Pa.
Super. Ct. 138, 302 A.2d 486 (1973).
159. W. PRossan, supra note 28, at 151.
160. Id. at 166.
161. Id. See also Denning Warehouse Co. v. Widener, 172 F.2d 910 (10th Cir.
1949); Hellweg v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 110 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 F. 801 (2d Cir. 1910).
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An additional problem is posed by electronic computers that are used
to control activities that may cause physical injury. The automated op-
eration of trains, use of automatic aircraft landing devices, and control
of chemical or atomic plants or electric utility distribution grids illus-
trate a few of the many situations in which computer failure may greatly
affect human safety. Where such computers make a purely mechanical
error that causes personal injury, the difficulty in establishing liability
for negligence is often acute. 6 2  In particular, it is sometimes impos-
sible to isolate the source of the mechanical error. Accordingly, third
parties injured in such situations may be able to recover only under the
principle of res ipsa loquitur 163 or the developing doctrine of strict tort
liability. 164
3. Strict Liability
The doctrine of "strict liability in tort" is now an accepted basis of
legal responsibility in several jurisdictions. 165  Under this doctrine, a
manufacturer or distributor of a defective product which is unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer is subject to strict liability for per-
sonal injuries caused by the product.166 The plaintiff suing under this
162. See Freed, Your Computer Witness for the Prosecution, MANAGEMENT REV.
(1962); Liability for Computerized Losses, in 141 FoR THE DEFENSE (1972). The com-
puter's printouts may be the only evidence substantiating the mechanical malfunction.
Computer printouts, however, are heresay statements unless they fall within an exception
to the rule against heresay. See Note, Appropriate Foundation Requirements for Admit-
ting Computer Printouts into Evidence, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 59, 62-73, 78-90. See gen-
erally C. MCCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE § 224 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972); 5 J. WIGMOlE, A TREATISE ON TIE ANGLO-AMEmCAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TmuLs AT COMMON LAW § 1364 (rev. ed. J. Chadbourne 1974).
163. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 165-176 infra and accompanying text.
165. The doctrine of strict liability in tort is now accepted and applied by most state
courts. In Greens v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965),
the district court observed that strict tort liability is "hardly more than what exists under
implied warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer, require-
ments of notice of defect, and limitation through inconsistencies with express warran-
ties." (citations omitted). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 656-58; Keeton,
Products Liability - The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, U. ILL. L.F. 693 (1964);
Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. LJ. 5 (1965).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 402A:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property; if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b)
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doctrine must show that there was some defect in the product which
makes it unreasonably dangerous. 16  The doctrine applies to purchasers,
consumers, or third persons, whether or not negligence is shown;s 8 its
application, however, has thus far been limited to the sale of "goods,"
not services. 6"
There are two important cases concerning strict product liability that
apply to the computer industry. In Southern California Retailer's Credit
Service Co. v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 70 Statistical Tabulating sup-
plied plaintiff with an accounting system that was designed to produce
a set of weekly and monthly reports. The reports proved unsatisfac-
tory, and plaintiff brought suit based on breach of contract and strict
products liability. In support of the latter claim, plaintiff argued that
the end resplt of the system, accounting reports, was a product; the de-
fendant contended that the reports were a service, thereby precluding
recovery for products liability.' 7' Although the court overruled the
it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has ex-
ercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product and (b) the
user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
167. Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969)
(defective means the product does not meet the reasonable expectation of the ordinary
consumer as to its safety). See generally Freedman, "Defect" in the Product: The
Necessary Basis for Products Liability in Tort and Warranty, 33 TENN. L. REV. 323
(1969); Keeton, Products Liability: Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEX. L. REv. 855 (1963); Trayner, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965).
168. Recovery under the doctrine of strict tort liability was originally limited to di-
rect users or consumers of the defective product. Recently, however, several courts have
expanded the scope of the doctrine to include foreseeable third parties. See, e.g., Wasik
v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970); Trojan Boat Co. v. Lutz, 358 F.2d 299 (5th Cir.
1966); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr.
652 (1969); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965);
Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969). See Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
169. The general rationale for excluding the sale of services from the application of
strict tort liability is that services, unlike goods, are not offered to the public in mass
produced quantities. See La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 938 (3d Cir.
1968). In the case of a manufacturer of computer products, the term "goods" can in-
clude, in addition to machines and equipment, output in the form of punched cards, mag-
netic or punched tapes, storage disks, and printed instructions.
170. DATAMATON, July 1969, at 115.
171. See note 169 supra and accompanying text,
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defendant's demurrer to a strict liability claim, the basis of its decision
was not disclosed. Since the case was never fully adjudicated, its
precedential value is limited; nevertheless, it does suggest that strict
liability might apply to computer-related items.
In the second case, LaRossa v. Scientific Design Co.,172 plaintiff
brought an action for wrongful death based on a theory of strict tort
liability. Plaintiff's decedent was an employee of Witco Chemical
Company (Witco), a manufacturer of chemical products. Under a
written contract with Witco, the defendant was to design, engineer, and
supervise the construction of a new chemical plant. One of the final
steps in completing this operation consisted of loading a catalyst in the
form of pellets into a reactor. The plaintiff argued that this loading
process produced a carcinogenic dust, the inhalation of which ultimately
caused the decedent's death. She further alleged that the defendant,
in agreeing to perform these services for Witco, had impliedly war-
ranted to all those concerned that it would insure their safety. The
court noted that this claim' 73 was one of strict liability in tort which,
although broad in scope, "still bears the imprint of its origin in contrac-
tual warranty."' 74  Because the court concluded that the basic policy
favoring the application of the strict tort liability doctrine-the difficulty
consumers face in tracing a defect in mass produced products to its
origin" 6'--does not apply to suppliers of professional services such as
the defendant, it held that suppliers would be liable only if they were
negligent. 17
Although the LaRossa case did not directly involve the computer
industry, it suggests a basis for holding that suppliers of computer soft-
ware services are outside the reach of strict tort liability. If computer
software services, like engineering and design services, are considered
''professional services," the suppliers' of software items cannot be
172. 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968).
173. Id. at 940.
174. Id. at 941.
175. According to the La Rossa court, it was this public policy consideration that
compelled the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), to recognize the doctrine of strict products liability. See
Prosser, supra note 168, at 793-94.
176. 402 F.2d at 942-43. The exclusion of suppliers of professional services from
strict liability in tort has also been upheld in Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner
Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833 (Alas. 1967); Lane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc., v. D.E.
Britt Assocs., 168 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1964); Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d
15 (1954), cited in 402 F.2d at 943 n.17.
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held strictly liable for injuries arising out of their computer transac-
tions.'17 Nevertheless, the court in Southern California Retailer's Credit
seemed prepared to adopt a products liability theory. Thus, the scope
of computer "goods" may be liberally interpreted, thereby enhancing
the possibility of imposing strict liability for defects in computer soft-
ware products.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has considered the main categories of liability exposure
for manufacturers and users of computer hardware and software
products. In the area of contract liability, the remedies and amount
of damages may be expressly limited, provided the parties have care-
fully drafted the agreement.'78 Liability on a theory of warranties may
be restricted by appropriate disclaimers and specific descriptions of the
computer features or software services to be provided.' 7 9  Where the
computer manufacturer or software provider surveys the purchaser's
computer needs, or participates in the system's design or installation,
the courts are more likely to find that the vendor has knowledge of
the particular purpose for which the system is intended, thus broaden-
ing his potential liability.8 0
Liability for negligent system design has also been considered.18'
The central, unresolved issue is the standard of care in the design
and furnishing of computer equipment or services which courts should
apply. What design and audit precautions must be employed by the
vendor to insure against equipment and output failures in order to
meet the standard of care which the court is likely to impose? Be-
cause of the general aura of mystery and infallibility surrounding com-
puters, courts are likely to require a high degree of care in the creation
of design features and devices used to prevent failure of control com-
puters and computer programming errors.18 2
In the case of tort liability, the Clements case' 8 illustrates the danger
177. See notes 169, 174-77 supra and accompanying text.
178. See notes 78-96 supra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 137-39 supra and accompanying text.
180. See notes 134-36 supra and accompanying text.
181. See notes 159-64 supra and accompanying text.
182. See notes- 162-64 supra and accompanying text.
183. 298 F. Supp. 115, afO'd in pertinent part, 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971).
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of making representations outside of the contract. Under certain cir-
cumstances, the failure to honor those representations may constitute
fraud." Furthermore, because of the unequal bargaining position of
the parties and the customer's need to rely upon the vendor's representa-
tions concerning highly technical equipment, courts appear willing to
interpret future predictions to be present or past representations of
fact..85
Strict tort liability will apply to transactions between the computer
hardware or software seller of goods and direct users and consumers.
The range of software included within that term, however, has yet to
be determined. Additionally, it is doubtful whether the doctrine will
apply to third persons who are not direct users or consumers of the
seller's product. 8 '
As this Article has shown, the law of computer liability is still evolv-
ing. It is important during this period that the societal values which
have developed over two centuries of America's growth not be eroded
by this new technology. This will require continuous reflection upon
the nature of the computer, its role in society, and its appropriate
control by legal norms and institutions.
184. See notes 140-50 supra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 151-54 supra and accompanying text.
186. A caveat to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A disclaims any opinion
by the Restatement Reporter as to whether the doctrine of strict liability is applicable
to persons other than users or consumers. See note 168 supra.
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